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Abstract
We determine the endogenous order of moves in a mixed price-setting duopoly.
In contrast to the existing literature on mixed oligopolies we establish the payoff
equivalence of the games with an exogenously given order of moves. Hence, it does not
matter whether one becomes a leader or a follower. We also establish that replacing a
private firm by a public firm in the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth game with capacity
constraints increases social welfare and that a pure-strategy equilibrium always exists.
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1 Introduction
The early literature on mixed oligopolies considered games with a predetermined order of
moves and investigated market regulation possibilities through a public firm, especially, in
order to increase social welfare. For instance, Cremer, Marchand, and Thisse (1989) analyze
the regulation of a simultaneous-move quantity-setting oligopoly market for which they
report that the market outcome is equivalent to the solution, in which the central authority
maximizes total surplus subject to the constraints that the public firms must break even.
Fraja and Delbono (1989) show for a mixed quantity-setting homogeneous good oligopoly
that public leadership leads to higher social welfare than the simultaneous-move mixed or
standard oligopolies.1 However, comparing the simultaneous-move case with or without
a public firm leads to an ambivalent result: It can happen that if there are sufficiently
many identical firms on the market, then the public firm is better advised to maximize its
profits in order to increase social welfare. Remaining in the quantity-setting framework,
∗Department of Economic Analysis and Business Informatics, H-4028 Debrecen, Kassai u´t 26. e-mail:
tamas.balogh@econ.unideb.hu
†Department of Mathematics, H-1093 Budapest, Fo˝va´m te´r 8. e-mail: attila.tasnadi@uni-corvinus.hu
1We will frequently refer to oligopolies without public firms as standard or purely private oligopolies.
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Corneo and Jeanne (1994) derive conditions under which the presence of a public firm can
be beneficial.2
In a seminal paper Pal (1998) investigates for mixed oligopolies the endogenous emer-
gence of certain orders of moves.3 Assuming linear demand and constant marginal costs,
he shows for a quantity-setting oligopoly with one public firm that the simultaneous-move
case does not emerge, the public firm as a first mover emerges just in the two-period
duopolistic case, while the private firms moving simultaneously in the first period followed
by the public firm in the second period always constitutes a subgame-perfect Nash equi-
librium of the timing game. His main observations are that incorporating a public firm
substantially changes the outcome of the timing game and that the presence of a public
firm increases social welfare.4 Matsumura (2003) relaxes the assumptions of linear demand
and identical marginal costs employed by Pal (1998). The case of increasing marginal costs
in Pal’s (1998) framework has recently been investigated by Tomaru and Kiyono (2010).5
There is less literature on price-setting mixed oligopolies. Ogawa and Kato (2006)
consider mixed duopolies in the framework of a homogeneous good price-setting game.
They investigate a symmetric Bertrand duopolistic setting in which the firms have to
serve the entire demands they face. Assuming linear demand and identical quadratic cost
functions, they find for the two sequential-move games that the presence of a public firm
may be either harmful or beneficial, while for the simultaneous-move game the outcome
remains the same as shown by Dastidar (1995) for the purely private case. In a recent work
Roy Chowdhury (2009) considers a price-setting mixed Bertrand duopoly (that is, firms
have to serve the demands they face) and a mixed semi-Bertrand duopoly (in which only
the public firm has to meet all demand). However, he focuses on the simultaneous-move
case, and thus, does not solve the timing problem. For a heterogeneous goods price-setting
mixed duopoly timing game Ba´rcena-Ruiz (2007) obtained the endogenous emergence of
simultaneous moves.
In this paper we investigate a homogeneous good mixed Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly
with capacity constraints. In contrast to the literature on endogenous timing in purely
private firm oligopolies as well as mixed oligopolies we find that the order of moves does
not matter (Corollary 1). In addition, social welfare is higher in the mixed version of the
Bertrand-Edgeworth game than in its standard version with only private firms (Corollary
2). As a byproduct we obtain that the mixed version of the Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly
game has an equilibrium in pure strategies for any capacity levels (Corollary 3).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our frame-
work and introduce the necessary notations. In Section 3 we recall the results of Deneckere
and Kovenock (1992) on the capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly game with
purely private firms, which we will need in comparing the results of the mixed version of
the Bertrand-Edgeworth game with its standard version. Section 4 determines the equilib-
2For other notable contributions in these directions, see for instance, Harris and Wiens (1980), Beato
and Mas-Colell (1984) and Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1997).
3The timing question in purely private oligopolies has been investigated earlier by Gal-Or (1985),
Dowrick (1986), Boyer and Moreaux (1987), Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and Deneckere and Kovenock
(1992), among others.
4Jacques (2004) noted that in the duopolistic case with more than two periods the public firm producing
in the first period and the private firm producing in the last period is also a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium. In addition, Lu (2007) shows for the duopolistic case there are even more subgame-perfect
Nash equilibria in which the private firm can produce in any period with the exception of the last one and
the public firm has to produce in a subsequent period.
5For further extensions we refer to Anam, Basher, and Chiang (2007) and Lu and Poddar (2009), among
others.
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ria of three games with exogenously given orderings of moves. Section 5 gathers the main
consequences of our analysis carried out in Section 4. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
2 The framework
The demand is given by function D on which we impose the following restrictions:
Assumption 1. The demand function D intersects the horizontal axis at quantity a
and the vertical axis at price b. D is strictly decreasing, concave and twice continuously
differentiable on (0, a); moreover, D is right-continuous at 0, left-continuous at b and
D(p) = 0 for all p ≥ b.
Clearly, any price-setting firm will not set its price above b. Let us denote by P the
inverse demand function. Thus, P (q) = D−1 (q) for 0 < q ≤ a, P (0) = b, and P (q) = 0
for q > a.
On the producers’ side we have a public firm and a private firm, that is, we consider a
so-called mixed duopoly. We label the public firm with 1 and the private firm with 2. Our
assumptions imposed on the firms’ cost functions are as follows:
Assumption 2. The two firms have zero unit costs up to their respective positive capacity
constraints k1 and k2.
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We shall denote by pc the market clearing price and by pM the price set by a monopolist
without capacity constraints, i.e. pc = P (k1 + k2) and p
M = arg maxp∈[0,b] pD (p). In what
follows p1, p2 ∈ [0, b] stand for the prices set by the firms.
For all i ∈ {1, 2} we shall denote by pmi the unique revenue maximizing price on the
firms’ residual demand curves Dri (p) = (D(p)− kj)+, where j ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= i, i.e.
pmi = arg maxp∈[0,b] pD
r
i (p). The inverse residual demand curves will be denoted by R1
and R2. Clearly, p
c and pmi are well defined whenever Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied.
Let us denote by pdi the price for which p
d
i min{ki, Di
(
pdi
)} = pmi Dri (pmi ), whenever
this equation has a solution.7 Provided that the private firm has ‘sufficient’ capacity (i.e.
pc < pm2 ), then if it is a profit-maximizer, it is indifferent to whether serving residual
demand at price level pmi or selling min{ki, Di
(
pdi
)} at the lower price level pdi .
Concerning the employed rationing rule, we impose the following assumption.
Assumption 3. We assume efficient rationing on the market.
Thus, the firms’ demands equal
∆i (D, p1, q1, p2, q2) =

D (pi) if pi < pj
Ti(p, q1, q2) if p = pi = pj
(D (pi)− qj)+ if pi > pj
for all i ∈ {1, 2}, where Ti stands for a tie-breaking rule.8 We will consider two sequential-
move games (one with the public firm as the first mover and one with the private firm as
6The real assumption here is that firms have identical unit costs since in case of production-to-order,
as will be assumed later, this is just a matter of normalization.
7The equation defining pdi has a solution if, for instance, p
m
i ≥ pc, which will be the case in our analysis
when we will refer to pdi .
8The selection of the appropriate tie-breaking rule will ensure the existence of a Nash equilibrium
or subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in order to avoid the consideration of ε-equilibria implying a more
difficult analysis without substantial gain.
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the first-mover) and a simultaneous-move game. An appropriate tie-breaking rule will be
specified for each of the three cases.
We assume that the firms play the production-to-order type Bertrand-Edgeworth game,
and therefore, the game reduces to a price-setting game since the firms can adjust their
productions to the demands they face. Now we are ready to specify the firms objective
functions. The public firm aims to maximize total surplus, that is,
pi1(p1, p2) =
∫ min{(D(pj)−ki)+,kj}
0
Rj(q)dq +
∫ min{a,ki}
0
P (q)dq, (1)
where 0 ≤ pi ≤ pj ≤ b. Figure 1 illustrates the social welfare, where the area indicated
by black dashed lines corresponds to the second integral, while the area indicated by grey
dashed lines corresponds to the first integral in expression (1). It should be mentioned
Figure 1: Social welfare
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that the first integral is not directly drawn based on Rj , but by a rightward shift of the
vertical axis by ki units, which enables us to illustrate the social welfare in one figure. It
can be easily seen that in determining social welfare the low price does not play a role
unless both prices are too high.
The private firm is a profitmaximizer, and therefore,
pi2(p1, p2) = p2 min {k2,∆2 (D, p1, k1, p2, k2)} . (2)
3 The benchmark
We will compare our price-setting mixed-oligopoly games with the price-setting games with
purely private firms, that is, both firms’ profit functions take the form of the expression
given by (2). The purely private case has been investigated by Deneckere and Kovenock
(1992) from which we recall the interesting case in which the simultaneous-move game
does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies, i.e., pm2 > p
c in case of k2 ≥ k1.9 We shall
emphasize that Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) assume for the sequential-move games
9For other cases the game reduces to the standard Cournot and Bertrand games.
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that the demand is allocated first to the second mover10 and for the simultaneous-move
case that the demand is allocated in proportion of the firms’ capacities.11
Proposition 1 (Deneckere and Kovenock,1992). Under k2 ≥ k1, pm2 > pc and Assump-
tions 1-3, the results below are known about the equilibrium of the three games.
1. The simultaneous-move game only has an equilibrium in mixed strategies with com-
mon support [pd2, p
m
2 ] and equilibrium profits are equal to pi
S
1 = p
d
2k1 and pi
S
2 =
pm2 D
r
2(p
m
2 ) = p
d
2 min{k2, D
(
pd2
)}.12
2. If firm 2 moves first and firm 1 second, then in a subgame-perfect equilibrium the
equilibrium prices are given by p2 = p1 = p
m
2 and the respective equilibrium profits
equal piL2 = p
m
2 D
r
2(p
m
2 ) and pi
F
1 = p
m
2 k1. In addition, if k1 = k2, then we also have
a second subgame-perfect equilibrium with equilibrium prices given by p2 = p
d
2 and
p1 = p
m
2 .
3. If firm 1 moves first and firm 2 second, then in a subgame-perfect equilibrium the
equilibrium prices are given by p1 = p
d
2 and p2 = p
m
2 and the respective equilibrium
profits equal piL1 = p
d
2k1 and pi
F
2 = p
m
2 D
r
2(p
m
2 ). In addition, if k1 = k2, then we also
have a second subgame-perfect equilibrium with equilibrium prices given by p1 = p
m
2
and p2 = p
m
2 .
Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) find that firm 2 moving first and firm 1 moving second
constitutes an equilibrium of the timing game, which can be verified by looking at the
payoff table of a two-period timing game shown in Table 1, where in case of k2 > k1 we
have piF1 > pi
S
1 = pi
L
1 and pi
L
2 = pi
S
2 = pi
F
2 .
Table 1: Payoffs for the two period timing game.
First period Second period
First period (piS1 , pi
S
2 ) (pi
L
1 , pi
F
2 )
Second period (piF1 , pi
L
2 ) (pi
S
1 , pi
S
2 )
In addition, by introducing more time periods and discounting, Deneckere and
Kovenock (1992) achieve that this ordering of moves is the one and only emerging en-
dogenously.
4 Exogenously given order of moves
In our analysis we will discuss the above mentioned three games with exogenously given
ordering of moves for the mixed duopoly version of the Bertrand-Edgeworth game. We are
restricting ourselves again to the interesting case in which the simultaneous-move purely
private version of the Bertrand-Edgeworth game does not have an equilibrium in pure
strategies, i.e. max{pm1 , pm2 } > pc.13 Note that as there are two different types of firms (as
10This distinction ensures that the second mover does not need to slightly undercut the first mover.
11It should be emphasized that the obtained results remain valid for a large class of other tie-breaking
rules employed in the simultaneous-move game.
12The results gathered in case 1 summarize the results obtained by Levitan and Shubik (1972), Kreps
and Scheinkman (1983) and Osborne and Pitchik (1986).
13Otherwise, the ordinary price-setting game results in a market-clearing or a competitive outcome,
which also remains the outcome of the mixed duopoly game.
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far as their payoffs are concerned), it is not the same whether the private or the public
firm has the higher capacity. In particular, we have to distinguish between the following
two cases: (i) pm2 > p
c and (ii) pm1 > p
c ≥ pm2 . We will also refer to the first case as the
strong private firm case and to the second case as the weak private firm case. Therefore,
we would have to analyze both cases separately for all the three orderings of moves.
4.1 The strong private firm case
Firstly, let us make clear that the quantity pd2 having been defined earlier always exists
since pm2 > p
c. Therefore, we make no mistake if we use this quantity in our results in this
section.
Now we collect some basic results in the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1-3 and pm2 > p
c, it is in none of the timing games with
an exogenously given order of moves optimal for the private firm to declare p2 < p
d
2.
Proof. We get the result directly from the definition of pd2. By setting p2 = p
m
2 , even if the
private firm serves only residual demand, its profit will be higher than at a price p2 less
than pd2.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1-3 and pm2 > p
c, the social welfare in an equilibrium
cannot be larger than the social welfare associated with the case in which both firms set
price pd2.
Proof. The definition of the public firm’s profit implies that if a firm serves residual de-
mand, then the lower price it sets the higher the social welfare. On the other hand, if
a company is the low-price firm, and it produces at its capacity limit, then changing its
price, as long as it remains a capacity constrained low-price firm, does not alter social
welfare. The private firm will not set its price below pd2 by Lemma 1, while the public
firm cannot increase social welfare by setting a price below pd2. Hence, comparing all cases
satisfying min{p1, p2} ≥ pd2, social welfare is maximized when both firms set price pd2.
Lemmas 1 and 2 show that deleting strictly dominated strategies from the private firms
strategy set excludes prices below pd2 and after that p
d
2 turns out to be a weakly dominant
strategy of the public firm.
Now that we are aware of these results, we begin to discuss the three games with
an exogenously given ordering of moves. We will start with specifying the tie-breaking
rules for these games. The most common assumption if two firms set the same price, is
that they share the consumers in proportion to their capacities (i.e. firms i’s sales equal
min {ki, D(p)ki/(k1 + k2)}. Clearly, any of the two firms has the right to let its competitor
serve a certain portion of its consumers. Such an act would seem to be irrational at first
sight, but we will see below that if it is carried out by the public firm, it can drive the
market to a socially better equilibrium. A more complete specification of the game would
allow the public firm to select the consumers freely, strategically leaving them to the
private firm. However, we fix a tie-breaking rule, which turns out to be compatible with
the public firms incentives, and after determining the equilibria of the three games it can
be easily verified that the public firm could not have selected a better tie-breaking rule.
Assumption 4. We specify the tie-breaking rules for the three games in the following
way:
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• In the simultaneous-move game we assume that if p1 = p2 ≤ pd2, then the demand
is allocated first to the private firm (in other words: the public firm allows the
private to serve the entire demand up to its previously given capacity k2). Oth-
erwise the two firms share the consumers proportionally, i.e. firm i’s sales equal
min {ki, D(p)ki/(k1 + k2)}.
• When the public firm is the first mover, we assume that the entire demand is allocated
first to the private firm (i.e. to the second mover) at any price level in case of price
ties.
• Provided that the private firm moves first, if p1 = p2 ≤ pd2, then the demand is
allocated first to the private firm; otherwise the entire demand is allocated first to
the public firm (i.e. to the second mover).
One can observe that for prices higher than pd2 we employ the same tie-breaking rule as
Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) in establishing Proposition 1. For the simultaneous-move
game we could have selected many other tie-breaking rules for prices not equal to pd2. The
main requirement for prices above pd2 is that none of the firms has a priority to serve
consumers up to its capacity constraint in case of price ties. Turning to the game with a
public leader, it is easy to see that in case of other tie-breaking rules the subgames do not
have a solution since the private firm just wants to undercut the public firm’s price for
prices above pd2. Hence, allocating demand first to the second mover restores the solvability
of the game without changing the nature of the game. Finally, for the game with a private
leader we should remark that the public firm has many optimal replies since matching
or undercutting the private firm’s price does not change social welfare. However, if the
public firm wants to punish the private firm for setting high prices, then it should commit
itself to undercutting the private firm’s price. This commitment is credible since for prices
higher than pd2 the public firm has no incentive to deviate from undercutting the private
firm’s price in the second period, which explains why our tie-breaking rule gives priority
to the public firm.
Now we will give all the equilibria of the different cases in separate propositions. We
start with the simultaneous-move case.
Proposition 2 (Simultaneous moves). Assume that pm2 > p
c and Assumptions 1-4 hold.
Then the simultaneous-move game has the following two types of Nash-equilibria in pure
strategies:
p∗1 = p
∗
2 = p
d
2 (NE1) and p
∗
1 ≤ pd2, p∗2 = pm2 (NE2),
where the continuum of NE2 equilibria are payoff equivalent. Moreover, if k1 < k2 and
k1 < D(p
M ), then the simultaneous-move game has in addition the following set of Nash-
equlibria
p∗1 > max
{
pM , P (k2)
}
, p∗2 = max
{
pM , P (k2)
}
(NE3).
Finally, no other equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
Proof. We begin with NE1. According to the tie-breaking rule, the demand is allocated
first to the private firm which means that it sells min{k2, D
(
pd2
)} units while the remaining
demand (if there is any) is left for the public firm. The private firm can neither benefit
from setting a price below pd2 by Lemma 1 nor by setting a price above p
d
2 since then it
would face residual demand in which case the profit-maximizing price equals pm2 , and thus,
results in the same profit level as price pd2. Turning to the public firm, lowering its price
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means converting its income to consumer surplus. However, the sum (i.e. the payoff of the
public firm) remains the same. Raising its price would mean that the public firm faces
residual demand and achieves a lower level of social welfare than when it sets p1 = p
d
2.
As far as NE2 is concerned, based on the facts discussed for NE1, it can be easily
verified that neither the private, nor the public firm will alter its strategy. The same holds
for NE3 if the required conditions are satisfied.
It remains to be shown that no other equilibrium exists. Take an equilibrium profile
(p∗1, p∗2). By Lemma 1 p∗2 ≥ pd2. Let p = P (k1). Since the public firm can ensure at least
pi1(p, p) social welfare at price p, even if the private firm sets a higher price, we must have
p∗1 ≤ p, which in turn implies that p∗2 ≤ p since Dr2(p2) = 0 for all p2 > p. We cannot have
an equilibrium with pd2 < p
∗
1 = p
∗
2 ≤ p since otherwise the private firm would gain from
slightly undercutting the public firm’s price.
Assume that the equilibrium satisfies p∗1 < p∗2 ≤ p. Clearly, if pd2 < p∗1 < p, then the
private firm would benefit from undercutting price p∗1; a contradiction. If p∗1 = pd2, then we
must have either p∗2 = pd2 or p∗2 = pm2 ; and thus, we arrived to either an NE1 or NE2 type
profile. If p∗1 < pd2, then we must have p∗2 = pm2 , which is an NE2 type equilibrium profile.
Assume that the equilibrium satisfies p∗2 < p∗1 ≤ p. Suppose that k1 ≥ k2. Then
p ≤ P (k2), and therefore, the public firm faces a positive residual demand, which means
that it can increase social welfare by reducing its price; a contradiction. Assume that
k1 < k2. If D
r
1(p
∗
1) > 0, then we cannot have an equilibrium since once again the public
firm would benefit from decreasing its price. If Dr1(p
∗
1) = 0, then the public firm cannot
gain from altering its price. However, the private firm could benefit from increasing its
price by the concavity of D if p∗2 < pM . For the same reason the private firm would gain
from decreasing its price if p∗2 > pM subject to p∗2 ≥ P (k2). Hence, we just can have an
equilibrium if p∗2 = max
{
pM , P (k2)
}
and we arrived at an NE3 type profile.
We have to remark that NE3 is a very implausible equilibrium since it requires that
the public firm admits very high prices in the market and practically does not want to
enter the market. While in case of NE3 the public firm cannot increase social welfare it
still can increase consumer surplus and its own income by setting a price below pM , which
could be a natural secondary goal for the public firm if it has to select between prices
resulting in the same social welfare.
We continue with the case of public leadership.
Proposition 3 (Public firm moves first). Assume that pm2 > p
c and Assumptions 1-4
hold. Then the sequential-move game with the public firm as a first mover has the following
unique subgame-perfect Nash-equilibrium in pure strategies:
p∗1 = p
d
2, p
∗
2(p1) =

pm2 if p1 < p
d
2,
pd2 if p1 = p
d
2,
p1 if p
d
2 < p1 ≤ max{P (k2), pM},
max{P (k2), pM} if max{P (k2), pM} < p1.
(SPNE1)
Proof. First, we determine the reaction function p∗2(·) of the private firm. Clearly, if the
public firm sets a price below pd2, then the private firm reacts with p
m
2 . If the public firm
sets price pd2, then the private firm has two optimal replies: p
d
2 and p
m
2 . If p1 > p
d
2, then
the private firm will match the public firm’s price as long as it can sell its entire capacity
or it serves the entire demand at a price lower than pM . Finally, if p1 is larger than P (k2)
and larger than pM , then the private firm will either set a price to sell its entire capacity
or the monopolist’s price.
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The first period action of the private firm depends on the decision of the private firm
when the public firm sets price pd2. In other words the private firm’s reaction function is
either the one given by SPNE1 or
p∗2(p1) =

pm2 if p1 ≤ pd2;
p1 if p
d
2 < p1 ≤ max{P (k2), pM},
max{P (k2), pM} if max{P (k2), pM} < p1.
(3)
Concerning the reaction function given by SPNE1, the public firm maximizes social wel-
fare in the first period by choosing price p∗1 = pd2, and thus, SPNE1 is indeed a subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium.
Turning to the second reaction function given by (3), a first period social welfare
maximizing price does not exist if the private firm reacts in the way given by (3) since the
public firm wants to set its price as close as possible to pd2, but above p
d
2. Hence, (3) does
not yield a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we consider the case of private leadership.
Proposition 4 (Private firm moves first). Assume that pm2 > p
c and Assumptions 1-
4 hold. Then the sequential-move game with the private firm as a first mover has the
following two types of subgame-perfect Nash-equilibria:
p∗2 = p
d
2, p
∗
1(p2) =

p2 if p2 ≤ pd2,
p1 ∈ [0, p2] if pd2 < p2 ≤ P (k1),
P (k1) if p2 > P (k1);
(SPNE1)
and
p∗2 = p
m
2 , p
∗
1(p2) =
{
p1 ∈ [0, p2] if p2 ≤ P (k1),
P (k1) if p2 > P (k1);
(SPNE2)
where the continuum of SPNE1 as well as the continuum SPNE2 equilibria are payoff
equivalent, respectively. Moreover, if k1 < k2 and k1 < D(p
M ), then the sequential-move
game has in addition the following set of subgame perfect Nash-equilibria
p∗2 = max
{
pM , P (k2)
}
,
p∗1(p2) =

p1 ∈ [0, p2] if p2 < P (k2),
p1 ∈ [0, b] if P (k2) ≤ p2 < pM ,
p1 ∈
(
max
{
pM , P (k2)
}
, b
]
if p2 = max
{
pM , P (k2)
}
,
p1 ∈ [0, b] if max
{
pM , P (k2)
}
< p2 < P (k1),
P (k1) if P (k1) ≤ p2;
(SPNE3)
where the continuum of SPNE3 equilibria are payoff equivalent. Finally, no other equilib-
rium in pure strategies exists.
Proof. We solve the game by backward induction. In most cases the public firm maximizes
social welfare in period 2 by not setting a higher price than the private firm in period 1
since social welfare usually decreases with the higher price set by the two firms. In addition,
if the private firm sets a price not higher than pd2, then the public firm should not set a
price below the private firm’s price since anticipating this behavior the private firm would
set definitely price pm2 in period 1.
However, if the price set by the private firm is high enough so that it can serve the entire
market, then the public firm loses its influence on social welfare. It might be beneficial
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for the private firm to set an extremely high price if its capacity is larger than the public
firm’s capacity and the public firm cannot do better by matching or undercutting the
public firm’s price. Observe that in this latter case only the reaction of the public firm at
price max
{
pM , P (k2)
}
matters.
Taking this into account, we can obtain SPNE1, SPNE2 and SPNE3 as possible
types of subgame-perfect equilibria.
We have to remark that SPNE3 is an implausible equilibrium since it requires, for the
same reasons as explained after the proof of Proposition 2, that the private firm anticipates
a very strange reaction of the public firm. Hence, in all three games only type 1 or type 2
equilibria are plausible. But what will decide which of these two equilibria is to be played?
We now collect arguments in favor of (SP )NE1. Firstly, (SP )NE1 is the only Pareto-
optimal equilibrium among all the subgame-perfect Nash-equilibria. Secondly, an outcome
being very close to (SP )NE1 can be compelled by the public firm. Namely, assume that
the public company sets p1 = p
d
2 +  in any of the three cases. Then if the private firm sets
its price slightly below this level, it will be strictly better off than in case of (SP )NE1 or
(SP )NE2. Although the social welfare will be a bit lower than in case of (SP )NE1, but
far higher than in case of (SP )NE2. Therefore, this act is worth for the public firm to
avoid the risk of an (SP )NE2 type outcome.
To sum up, we argued that p∗1 = p∗2 = pd2 is the most plausible outcome that is expected
to be played.
4.2 The weak private firm case
Our second case to be analyzed occurs when pm1 > p
c ≥ pm2 . We begin the analysis with
the following lemma which dictates that the private firm is not intended to set any price
below the market clearing price.
Lemma 3. Under Assumptions 1-3 and pm1 > p
c ≥ pm2 the private firm’s strategies p2 < pc
are strictly dominated in all three possible orderings.
Proof. The private firm can only be worse off by selling all its capacity at a lower price
than the market clearing price due to the definition of pc and the fact that pm2 ≤ pc.
Before solving the game, we have to define how the firms share the market in case of
price ties. In particular, we employ the same tie-breaking rule as Deneckere and Kovenock
(1992).
Assumption 5. If the two firms set the same price, then we assume for the sequential-
move games that the demand is allocated first to the second mover and for the
simultaneous-move game that the demand is allocated in proportion of the firms’ ca-
pacities.
In contrast to the previous section, there is only one (subgame-perfect) Nash-
equilibrium in the weak private firm case resulting in a market-clearing outcome. This
is pointed out in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. If pm1 > p
c ≥ pm2 and Assumptions 1-3, 5 are satisfied, then each price-
setting game with an exogenously given ordering of moves has the following (subgame-
perfect) Nash-equilibria in pure strategies with the following equilibrium prices:
p∗1 ∈ [0, pc], p∗2 = pc (SPNE4)
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Moreover, there is no other equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof. Now we do not consider the different orderings separately, like we did in the previous
subsection. It is easy to see that any equilibrium of type SPNE4 specifies (subgame-
perfect) Nash-equilibrium prices in all the three possible orderings.
We briefly show that there are no other equilibrium price profiles left. Since by pm1 > p
m
2
we have k1 > k2, which in turn implies P (k1) < P (k2) none of the firms will set a
price above P (k1). Moreover, we cannot have an equilibrium with P (k1) ≥ p∗2 > p∗1 and
p∗2 > pc since this would imply that the private firm has to serve residual demand, which
would result in less profits for the private firm than setting pc by the concavity of the
residual demand function and by pm2 < p
c. In addition, there cannot be an equilibrium
with pc < p∗2 < p∗1 ≤ P (k1) neither because then the public firm could increase social
welfare by unilaterally decreasing its price. These arguments are valid for any ordering of
moves.
It remains to be shown that we cannot have pc < p∗1 = p∗2 ≤ P (k1) in an equilib-
rium, which we will check separately for the different orderings of moves. Concerning the
simultaneous-move case, the private firm would have an incentive to undercut the public
firm’s price. Turning to private leadership, the private firm has to serve residual demand
by Assumption 5, and therefore, it would prefer price pc to p∗2 by the concavity of the
residual demand function and by pm2 < p
c. Finally, considering public leadership, the pri-
vate firm matches the public firm’s price in region [pc, P (k1)], and thus, the public firm
maximizes social welfare by setting its price not larger than pc.
5 Implications
In this section we collect the corollaries of our analysis carried out in the previous section.
Our first corollary determines the endogenous order of moves based on a two-period timing
game in which both firms can select between two periods for setting their prices. If one
accepts our arguments brought forward in favor of a type 1 equilibrium (that is, an NE1
or an SPNE1) in case of a strong private firm, then by checking Propositions 2-4 one
immediately sees that the three type 1 equilibria result in the same equilibrium price pd2
and the same equilibrium payoffs. The case of a weak private firm is even simpler by
Proposition 5.
Corollary 1. Assuming that a type 1 equilibrium is played in the case of a strong private
firm, the ordering of price decisions does not matter.
Now we turn to the question whether replacing a public firm by a private firm (pri-
vatization) has a social welfare increasing effect. If one compares the equilibrium payoffs
in Proposition 1 with the type 1 equilibrium payoffs in Propositions 2-4 and Proposition
5, we can observe that for each ordering of moves switching from the standard Bertrand-
Edgeworth game (i.e. when there are only private firms on the market) to its mixed version
strictly increases social welfare.
Corollary 2. Assuming that a type 1 equilibrium is played in the case of a strong private
firm and capacities are in a range such that the standard simultaneous-move Bertrand-
Edgeworth game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies, then the appearance of a
public firm makes the outcome more competitive, i.e. the social welfare of the mixed version
of the Bertrand-Edgeworth game is higher than that of the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth
duopoly game.
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Earlier research in this field has pointed out that in general the standard simultaneous-
move version of the Bertrand-Edgeworth game does not have an equilibrium in pure strate-
gies (see, for example, Proposition 1).14 Considering Propositions 2 and 5, we see that the
simultaneous-move Bertrand-Edgeworth mixed duopoly game always has an equilibrium
in pure strategies.
Corollary 3. In contrast to the standard simultaneous-move Bertrand-Edgeworth game
its mixed duopoly version always has an equilibrium in pure strategies under Assumption
1-3.
6 Concluding remarks
We analyzed the mixed Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly game with the following two par-
ticipants: a private profit-maximizing firm and a public social welfare maximizing firm.
We found that the appearance of a public firm is advantageous from various points of
view. First, the timing of decisions does not play a role since all games with an exoge-
nously given order of moves result in the same outcome. Second, the appearance of a
public firm increases social welfare. Third, the mixed version of the simultaneous-move
Bertrand-Edgeworth game always has an equilibrium in pure strategies.
We have not investigated the situation yet, where more than one private firms exist on
the market. However, we should be aware that our knowledge concerning the Bertrand-
Edgeworth oligopoly game with only private firms is limited. Even the existence of an
equilibrium of multi-period games with exogenously given ordering of moves is not known
for the case in which at least pairs of firms move in different time periods. Most recent
results on the mixed-strategy equilibria of the simultaneous-move Bertrand-Edgeworth
oligopoly game by Hirata (2009) and De Francesco and Salvadori (2010) point to the
difficulty of the problem.
In the current paper we have investigated the production-to-order version of the
Bertrand-Edgeworth game. In a future work we plan to consider the production-in-advance
case for which answering the same questions addressed in this paper is much harder. In
particular, only the case of symmetric capacities appears to be tractable when comparing
the standard production-in-advance price-setting game with its mixed version, since the
firms’ mixed-strategy equilibrium profits are only known for that case (see Tasna´di 2004).
Other questions that could be addressed in future research within the capacity-
constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth framework are partial privatization (as initiated by Mat-
sumura 1998), free entry (as investigated for the quantity-setting case, for instance, by Ino
and Matsumura 2010), the presence of foreign private firms (see for example, Fjell and
Pal 1996), the endogenous emergence of capacity differentials between private and public
firms (like by Corneo and Rob 2003 in which the efficiency gap between private and public
firms is derived from workers’ incentives).
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